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Patent Buy-Outs for Global Disease
Innovations for Low- and MiddleIncome Countries
Kevin Outterson †

I.

INTRODUCTION

The World Health Organization’s CHOICE program analyzes the cost
effectiveness of various health interventions related to the Millennium Development
Goals. 1 The program identifies the best strategies for improving health in lowincome countries, using a standard set of methodological assumptions. 2 These
studies evaluate interventions in many areas, including child health 3 and
HIV/AIDS. 4
For some of these treatments, drug costs are a significant variable: if the drug
price doubles, the intervention becomes less cost effective. But if the drug price is
reduced by 90%, then more therapies become affordable. 5

†
Associate professor of law, West Virginia University. Kevin.Outterson@mail.wvu.edu. A
Hodges Research Grant from the College of Law supported this research, as did David Davis, my
research assistant. I am also grateful for the comments received at the seminar held at the Boston
University School of Law for this issue of the Journal.
1
WORLD HEALTH ORG., CHOOSING INTERVENTIONS THAT ARE C OST EFFECTIVE , available
at http://www.who.int/choice/en/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
2
David B. Evans et al., Time to Reassess Strategies for Improving Health in Developing
Countries, 331 B RIT . MED. J. 1133, 1135 (2005).
3
Tessa Tan-Torres Edejer et al., Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Strategies for Child Health in
Developing Countries, 331 B RIT . MED . J. 1177 (2005).
4
Daniel R. Hogan et al., Cost Effectiveness Analysis of Strategies to Combat HIV/AIDS in
Developing Countries, 331 BRIT . MED . J. 1431 (2005). The most cost effective interventions are mass
media campaigns for safer sex, peer education and treatment of sex workers, prevention of mother to
child transmission (PMCT), treatment of sexually transmitted infections, voluntary counseling and
testing, and ARV therapy. Id. at Tables 3 & 4.
5
Critics such as Amir Attaran question whether patents are important barriers to essential
medicines. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886 (2001); see also Amir Attaran, How Do
Patents and Economic Policies Affect Access to Essential Medicines in Developing Countries?;
Poverty, Not Patent Policies More Often Inhibits Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing
World, HEALTH AFF. 155 (Nov./Dec. 1994). One cannot have it both ways; if patents are indeed
unimportant in developing countries, then the drug industry wouldn’t be hurt by giving up those
patent rents. For a more expansive rebuttal to Attaran’s more nuanced position, see Kevin Outterson,
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug
Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 193, 255-58 (2005) [hereinafter Pharmaceutical
Arbitrage].
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Drug prices are uniquely susceptible to radical price reductions through generic
competition. Patented pharmaceuticals may be priced at more than 30 times the
marginal cost of production; 6 the excess is the patent rent collected by the drug
company while the patent and exclusive marketing periods remain. 7 Patent rents are
significant. AIDS drugs which sell for US$10,000 per person per year in the US are
sold generically for less than US$200. 8 If patented drugs could be sold at the
marginal cost of production, cost effective treatments would become even more
attractive, and other interventions would become affordable.
This Article proposes marginal cost (generic) pricing 9 for most essential
medicines used in the developing world. Global collection of patent rents must be
relaxed in order to achieve this objective. Some damage to the profits of
pharmaceutical companies would ordinarily be expected, but a properly designed
buy-out mechanism can ensure adequate incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.
Two case studies are examined to illustrate the proposal: the recently-developed
Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines for cervical cancer and second-line
antiretroviral (ARV) treatments for AIDS.
Global pharmaceutical markets and global disease burdens are mismatched,
making this proposal uniquely attractive. Some 80% to 90% of the global sales of
patented pharmaceuticals occur in the 30 wealthy countries which are members of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), roughly
similar to the World Bank’s definition of 29 high-income countries. 10
Pharmaceutical markets for patented products largely follow the money.
But the vast majority of patients needing treatment for global chronic and
infectious diseases reside in non-OECD (middle- and low-income) countries. These
countries include more than 84% of the world’s people, and they are
disproportionately sick. 11 The global burden of disease falls most heavily where the
market is least attractive.
This mismatch between global pharmaceutical markets and global disease
burdens leads to an interesting opportunity. Patented pharmaceuticals could be
offered to more than 84% of the world’s population at generic prices. (Only highincome country patients would continue to bear pharmaceutical patent rents). The
gain in health from increasingly affordable pharmaceuticals would be considerable.
6
Outterson, supra note 5, at 253-55 (demonstrating a differential pricing ratio exceeding
30:1 on 1st line ARVs, and a ratio of 264:1 on Ciprofloxacin).
7
Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical
Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 86-89 (2005) [hereinafter Outterson,
Vanishing Public Domain].
8
Outterson, supra note 5, at 253. When generic AIDS drugs were introduced in Malaysia in
2004, the prices dropped by 90%. Meraiah Foley, WHO Urges Nations to Bypass Patent Laws,
NEWSDAY , Sept. 22, 2005. When generic AIDS drugs were introduced in Malaysia in 2004, the prices
dropped by 90%. Id.
9
Under conditions of robust competition, generic pricing should approach marginal cost
pricing.
10
The official World Bank definition of high-income country is: “High-income country. A country
having an annual gross national product (GNP) per capita equivalent to $9,361 or greater in 1998. Most
high-income countries have an industrial economy. There are currently about 29 high-income countries in
the world with populations of one million people or more. Their combined population is about 0.9 billion,
less than one-sixth of the world’s population. In 2003, the cutoff for high-income countries was adjusted to
$9,206
or
more.”
World
Bank
Group,
DEPweb,
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/glossary.html#h (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
11
See id.; see also ANDRÉS DE FRANCISCO, THE 10/90 REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH: 2001-2002,
91-92 (Sheila Davey ed., Global Forum for Health Research, 2002) (discussing neglected and very neglected
diseases).
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The primary disadvantage of this plan would be a quite small reduction in global
R&D cost recovery; but even this small deficit could be restored to the companies
through a carefully designed patent buy-out mechanism. The World Health
Organization recently agreed to appoint an intergovernmental working group to
address issues of public health and innovation. 12 This article illustrates some of the
concepts which could be useful in that process.
II. GLOBAL DISEASES: BEYOND NEGLECTED DISEASES
Much attention has been focused over the past decade upon ‘neglected’ or
‘tropical’ diseases, conditions largely overlooked by global pharmaceutical research
companies. 13 Examples include onchocerciasis (river blindness), 14 leishmaniasis
(kala-azar), Chagas disease, and African sleeping sickness. 15 In the past few years,
donors have created some initiatives to direct R&D towards neglected diseases. 16
The neglected disease programme tends to overlook the fact that chronic
conditions in the high-income and low-income worlds are converging. 17 It is the
poor themselves who are neglected, rather than just their diseases. Global diseases
are conditions which affect patients in both rich and poor countries, but

12

World Health Organization, 59th World Health Assembly, PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION,
ESSENTIAL HEALTH RESEARCH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: TOWARDS A GLOBAL STRATEGY
AND PLAN OF ACTION (Agenda Item 11.11; A59/A/Conf.Paper No.8) (May 27, 2006) (hereinafter WHO
GLOBAL R&D RESOLUTION).
13
E.g., DE F RANCISCO , supra note 11; Bernard Pécoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in
Poor Countries: A Lost Battle?, 281 JAMA 361 (1999); David B. Ridley et al., Developing Drugs
For Developing Countries, 25 HEALTH AFF. 313 (2006); C OMMISSION ON HEALTH RESEARCH FOR
DEVELOPMENT, HEALTH R ESEARCH : ESSENTIAL LINK TO EQUITY IN DEVELOPMENT 3 (Commission on
Health Research for Development ed., Oxford University Press, 1990). The WHO GLOBAL R&D
RESOLUTION was not limited to tropical or neglected diseases, although it does focus on “diseases and
conditions disproportionately affecting developing countries.” WHO GLOBAL R&D RESOLUTION ,
supra note 12. The case studies in this article concern AIDS and cervical cancer, both of which
disproportionately affect people in developing countries.
14
For a voluntary Merck program to address onchocerciasis, see Jeffrey L. Sturchio & Brenda
D. Colatrella, Successful Public-Private Partnerships in Global Health: Lessons from the MECTIZAN
Donation Program, in THE ECONOMICS OF ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 255 (Brigitte Granville ed., Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 2002).
15
MÉDECINS S ANS FRONTIÈRES, F ATAL IMBALANCE: THE C RISIS IN R ESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT FOR DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES 11 (Médecins Sans Frontières Access to
Essential
Medicines
Campaign,
Sept.
2001),
available
at
http://www.msf.org/source/access/2001/fatal/fatalshort.pdf.
16
The Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, founded by a group of seven organizations,
focuses research and development efforts on 3 truly neglected diseases -- visceral leishmaniasis (Kalaazar), Human African Trypanosomiasis (Sleeping Sickness), and American Trypanosomiasis (Chagas
disease). See DNDi: Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, http://www.dndi.org (last visited Apr.
18, 2006).
17
Non-communicable disease accounted for 47% of the global burden of disease in 2001.
World Health Org., WHO GLOBAL S TRATEGY ON DIET, P HYSICAL ACTIVITY AND HEALTH 2 (May
2004),
available
at
http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/strategy/eb11344/strategy_english_web.pdf. Cardiovascular
disease (CVD) and cancer (malignant neoplasms) are the first and second most common causes of
death respectively in developing countries. World Health Org., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2003 81
(2003), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2003/en/whr03_en.pdf. “In 1998, non-communicable
diseases were responsible for 59% of total global mortality and 43% of the global burden of disease.
Importantly, 78% of NCD [non-communicable disease] deaths were borne by low- and middle-income
countries, as was 85% of the NCD burden of disease . . . nearly 50% of deaths worldwide were due to
CVD, diabetes, cancer and chronic lung disease.” STEPHEN LEEDER ET AL., A R ACE AGAINST TIME:
THE CHALLENGE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 13-14 (2004).

4

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 32 NO. 2&3 2006

disproportionately affect the poor. 18 The global disease list includes many of the
major chronic conditions associated with wealthy countries — including
cardiovascular disease, stroke, mental illness, diabetes, and arthritis. These diseases
are the leading causes of adult disease burdens throughout the world:
Figure 1.
Top 10 Global Disease Burdens in DALYs,
(Men 15 Years and Older) 19
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18
Herein, the term global disease refers to conditions for which a therapeutic market exists in
high-income countries, and the condition is also endemic to the low or middle income world. The
definition of global disease is not static. Malaria was once a global disease, but is now largely
eradicated in high-income countries, rendering it potentially neglected were it not for research for
military and tourist markets. Tuberculosis remains a significant condition in OECD markets, even
though its disease burden falls heavily on the poor. For a fuller discussion on global diseases in this
context, see Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential
Treatment in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, NW. J.
INT ’L L. & B US. 1, 25-28 (2005); Outterson, supra note 5, at 244-250.
19
The graph depicts DALYs lost due to various conditions in men aged 15 and above in 2002.
JUDITH MACKAAY & GEORGE A. MENSAH, WORLD HEALTH ORG. & CENTER FOR DISEASE C ONTROL
(CDC), ATLAS OF HEART DISEASE AND STROKE 46 (2004).
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Figure 2.
Top 10 Global Disease Burdens in DALYs,
(Women 15 Years and Older) 20
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The first characteristic of global diseases is that a robust level of research is
assured by high-income markets alone. Anticipated R&D cost recovery from lowand middle-income countries carry little or no weight in the decision to commit
resources to R&D concerning global diseases. The powerful lure of high-income
markets—particularly the US, the EU, and Japan—draw R&D funds to global
diseases, without much regard for the market potential in countries like Brazil or
Costa Rica. 21
AIDS is a paradigmatic case of a global disease. Several thousand early AIDS
cases in the United States and Europe were sufficient to trigger an avalanche of
science. 22 The global aspects of the epidemic were either unknown or relatively
unimportant to the decision to allocate research resources. ARV drugs would have
been invented on the same timetable even if no African or Asian had ever been
infected. High-income markets alone were sufficient incentive for discovery.
Cancer is another global disease. Development of HPV vaccines was prompted
by the multi-billion dollar market to prevent less than 17,000 cervical cancer deaths

20

Depicting DALYs lost due to these conditions in women aged 15 and above in 2002. Id. at

47.
21

Some observers claim that the incentive deficit in these countries is the lack of adequate IP
laws. See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha
“Solution,” 3 C HI . J. INT ’L L. 47, 58-62 (2002). As I have argued elsewhere at length, it is the
poverty of the people, rather than the lack of IP laws, which makes the collection of pharmaceutical
patent rents problematic in these countries. See Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at
§ I.D.4.viii (arguing that global and neglected diseases do not require additional IP laws in developing
countries).
22
Many early AIDS-related drugs qualified for orphan drug status in the United States when
the expected U.S. market was fewer than 200,000 persons. Steven R. Salbu, AIDS and Drug Policy: In
Search of a Policy, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 691, 703-707 (1993) (noting that the FDA designated AZT as
an orphan drug in 1987 and half of AIDS drugs as of August 1991 were designated as orphans). North
America and Western Europe account for less than two million of the thirty-four to forty-six million
people living with HIV/AIDS in 2003. UNAIDS/WORLD HEALTH ORG ., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 37
(2003),
available
at
http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/epidemiology/en/epiupdate2003_III_en.pdf
[hereinafter AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE].
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per year in high-income countries, 23 even though more than 90% of cervical cancer
deaths occur in low- and medium-income countries. 24 Similar global disease
profiles exist for other cancers: one recent study listed the 12 major types of cancer
for which the global burden of disease largely falls in the low- and middle-income
countries. 25 In every category the majority of the global cancer disease burden fell
in low- and middle-income countries. 26 Only cancers of the lungs, pancreas, colon
and rectum were disproportionately found in high-income countries, but nevertheless
the majority of the burden remained in low- and middle-income countries. 27
Global diseases have a second important characteristic: global disease
innovation can be shared without damaging innovation.
Knowledge is
nonrivalrous. 28 Global disease innovation can be offered to low- and mediumincome countries without damaging patent rents from high-income countries. While
diversion, theft and arbitrage from low-income to high-income markets is a potential
threat, companies and governments possess many tools to block pharmaceutical
arbitrage, and empirical evidence of significant dysfunctional arbitrage is limited. 29
The much more significant threat to high-income country patent rents – and to
public health – comes from counterfeit pharmaceuticals, which are greatly
encouraged by the high price discrimination ratios made possible by IP law. 30
Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a grave threat to health in the developing world, 31
and the US drug supply chain itself appears remarkably vulnerable. 32 One important
ancillary advantage of generic pricing is the virtual elimination of the incentive to
counterfeit drugs in low- and medium-income countries: with artificial price
discrimination stripped away, the vast majority of the economic incentive to create a
counterfeit disappears. 33
With innovation assured, the further collection of patent rents can stand aside
and permit generic-priced access for the majority of humanity. The fruits of OECD
global disease innovation can be freely shared with the low- and middle-income
world through marginal cost pricing without harming innovation incentives.

23

Goodarz Danaei et al., Causes of Cancer in the World: A Comparative Risk Assessment of Nine
Behavioral and Environmental Risk Factors, 366 The Lancet 1784, 1787 (Table 2) (Nov. 19, 2005). See
Ruth Mayne, United Nations Dev. Programme, Regionalism, Bilateralism, and “TRIP Plus” Agreements:
The
Threat
to
Developing
Countries
21
(2005),
http://hdr.undp.org/docs/publications/background_papers/2005/HDR2005_Mayne_Ruth_18.pdf.
24
K Shibuya et al., Global and Regional Estimates of Cancer Mortality and Incidence by Site:
II. Results for the Global Burden of Disease 2000, 2 BMC C ANCER 37 (2002) (table 7, excluding
regions AMRO A, EURO A, and EURO B1).
25
Danaei et al., supra note 23, at 1789 (Figure 2).
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Kevin Outterson, Fair Followers: Expanding Access to Generic Pharmaceuticals for LowIncome Populations, in THE POWER OF P ILLS (P. Illingworth & J. Clare, eds.) (forthcoming 2006)
[hereinafter Outterson, Fair Followers]; Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain, supra 7, at 89-92
(2005); Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 197, 217-19, 222-30; and the sources
cited therein.
29
These issues have been discussed at significant length in Outterson, Pharmaceutical
Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 231-35, 261-68, 284-90.
30
Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra 5, at 268-71; Kevin Outterson, Counterfeit
Drugs: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 16 A LBANY L. J. S CI . & TECH . (forthcoming 2006).
31
WORLD HEALTH ORG., C OUNTERFEIT MEDICINES, F ACT S HEET NO. 275 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/.
32
See generally KATHERINE EBAN , DANGEROUS DOSES : HOW C OUNTERFEITERS ARE
CONTAMINATING AMERICA ’S DRUG SUPPLY (Harcourt 2005).
33
Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 5, at 268-71.
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We now turn to two case studies to examine in more depth the potential for
generic pricing in low- and middle-income countries.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. HPV VACCINES TO PREVENT CERVICAL CANCER
Cervical cancer is a significant cause of cancer death for women worldwide.
More than 470,000 cases are diagnosed each year, 34 resulting in approximately
230,000 annual deaths globally. 35 Cervical cancer exemplifies the split between
global disease burdens and markets: about 92% of cervical cancer deaths occur in
low- and middle-income countries, 36 while perhaps 90% of the revenue market for
cervical cancer treatments will be in high-income countries. 37
The first HPV vaccine to prevent cervical cancer was recently approved by the
US FDA. 38 In 2002, Merck’s vaccine for Human Papillomavirus Type 16 (HPV-16)
demonstrated significant efficacy against cervical cancer in a controlled trial. 39
Merck has also tested a quadrivalent HPV-6, -11, -16 and -18 vaccine, Gardasil. 40
In November 2004, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) published its positive results for a
bivalent HPV-16 and -18 vaccine (Cervarix), based on trials in the US and Brazil. 41
In May 2006, an FDA Advisory Committee unanimously recommended approval of
Gardasil for the US market, 42 and the FDA approved the vaccine on June 8, 2006. 43
The health potential for a generic priced HPV vaccine in low- and middleincome countries is significant. Within a generation of widespread vaccination, the
most dangerous types of HPV could be largely eradicated. GSK projects that its
vaccine will be cost effective “in both screened and unscreened populations, with
important long-term implications for cervical cancer prevention, especially in
countries where screening is limited or unavailable.” 44

34
See Dianne M. Harper et al., Efficacy of a Bivalent L1 Virus-like Particle Vaccine in
Prevention of Infection With Human Papillomavirus Types 16 and 18 in Young Women: A
Randomised Controlled Trial, 364 THE LANCET 1757, 1757 (2004) (estimating 470,000 as of 2004);
Christopher P. Crum, Editorial, The Beginning of the End for Cervical Cancer?, 347 NEW ENG . J.
MED . 1703, 1703 (2002) (estimating 450,000 as of 2002).
35
See Danaei et al., supra note 23, at 1787 (Table 2)(234,728); Paul D. Blumenthal & Lynne
Gaffikin, Cervical Cancer Prevention: Making Programs More Appropriate and Pragmatic, 294
JAMA 2225, 2225 (2005) (more than 230,000).
36
There were 218,064 deaths in low- and middle-income countries compared to 234,728
deaths worldwide. Danaei et al., supra note 23, at 1787 tbl.2. The GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) study
noted that “almost 80% of the cases occur in developing countries.” Harper et al., supra note 34, at
1757. The difference derives from GSK using “developing countries” rather than “low- and middleincome countries.”
37
See MAYNE, supra note 23, at 26 (estimates of GSK’s global market for ARVs).
38
Gardiner Harris, U.S. Approves Use of Vaccine for Cervical Cancer, NY TIMES, June 9, 2006.
39
Laura A. Koutsky et al., A Controlled Trial of a Human Papillomavirus Type 16 Vaccine,
347 NEW ENG. J. MED . 1645, 1649 (2002).
40
Press Release, Merck, Merck's Investigational Vaccine GARDASIL™ Prevented 100 Percent of
Cervical Pre-cancers and Non-invasive Cervical Cancers Associated with HPV Types 16 and 18 in New
Clinical
Study
(Oct.
6,
2005),
available
at
http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press_releases/research_and_development/2005_1006.html.
41
Harper et al., supra note 34, at 1760 tbl.1 (somewhat less than half of the study participants
were in Brazil).
42
US FDA Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee, May 18, 2006.
43
Harris, supra note 38.
44
Harper et al., supra note 34, at 1764.
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In the US, GSK’s Cervarix HPV vaccine is projected to cost between
US$20,600 to US$60,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY), amounts which are
considered cost effective in the US market. 45 The GSK study does not disclose the
anticipated US sales price of Cervarix in this model, 46 but these estimates suggest
that GSK could raise the vaccine price significantly in the US market while still
keeping the QALY cost below US$75,000. 47 Indeed, the study modeled total
vaccination costs up to US$1000 per patient, at which point vaccination becomes
less cost effective than screening alone. 48 This data suggests an upper limit price of
the Cervarix vaccine series at approximately US$623. 49
GSK projects annual sales of Cervarix to exceed £1 billion, 50 a blockbuster
drug. While we do not know GSK’s anticipated unit price, the total female
population aged 12 in all high-income countries is approximately 6 million
persons. 51 If GSK anticipates meeting half of that volume, 52 then their Cervarix
price in high-income countries must be approximately £333 per person, or about
US$570. 53 Merck recently announced that the wholesale price for Gardasil will be
$360 per person in the US. 54
These calculations assume that only adolescent females are vaccinated, but the
FDA Advisory Committee briefing package for Merck’s Gardasil included some
discussions about vaccinating boys as well. Apparently, Merck plans to market the
HPV vaccine for both male and female adolescents. 55 Doubling the vaccinated
population would increase profits but reduce the cost-effectiveness threshold for
HPV vaccines. It should be noted that the clinical trials cited above only reported
efficacy for vaccination of females.
A cervical cancer vaccine which is affordable and just marginally cost effective
in the US market will be too expensive and cost ineffective for the average family in
a low- or middle-income market where health expenditures per capita average
45
Sue J. Goldie et al., Projected Clinical Benefits and Cost-Effectiveness of a Human
Papillomavirus 16/18 Vaccine, 96 J. NAT’L C ANCER INST. 604, 608-609 (2004), available at
http://jncicancerspectrum.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/jnci;96/8/604.pdf.
46
The model identifies ‘vaccination costs’ of US$377 (base case), with a range of US$188 to
US$565, but Table 1 does not identify how much is allocated to the “three brief clinic visits,
surveillance and education costs” and how much derives from the cost of the vaccine itself. Id. at 607
tbl 1. The model assumes 100% coverage of all 12-year old females in the U.S., a market of almost
two million girls per year. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU , ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE P OPULATION BY
SELECTED AGE GROUPS AND S EX FOR THE UNITED S TATES: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2004 tbl.2
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/national/asrh/NC-EST2004-sa.html.
47
Goldie et al., supra note 45, at 609 tbl.3, 613 n.14.
48
Id.
49
Taking the US$1000 as an upper limit, and subtracting the US$377 base case. If costs of
the vaccine itself are already included in the base case, the upper limit would be somewhat higher.
50
Ben Hirschler, Glaxo Says Cervarix to Transform the Vaccine Business, REUTERS, May 27,
2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/business/biotech/20050527-0200-healthglaxo-vaccines.html. See MAYNE , supra note 23, at 21.
51
HNP
Summary
Profile,
http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/groupData/GetShowData.asp?sCtry=HIC
(last
visited May 9, 2006) (2002 data).
52
Merck’s vaccine was granted FDA on June 8, 2006. Harris, supra note 38.
53
The exchange rate on Nov. 28, 2005 was 1 GBP = 1.72 USD. One can find the current
exchange rate at http://www.xe.com (the author used http://www.xe.com to deduce the figure in the
text using the relevant exchange rate on Nov. 28, 2005).
54
Harris, supra note 38; see also Panel Backs Vaccine for Cervical Cancer, New York Times, May
19, 2006.
55
Patrick Brill-Edwards, Gardasil Human Papillomavirus (Types 6, 11, 16, 18) Recombinant
Vaccine 10, 14, 61-66 (April 19, 2006) (final briefing document filed by Merck to the US FDA for the May
18, 2006 meeting of the FDA Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee).

PATENT BUY-OUTS FOR GLOBAL DISEASE INNOVATIONS

9

US$73.40. 56 Even a vaccine priced at 10% of the high-income price (say, US$36) is
completely unaffordable. If we use proportion of per capita health expenditures as a
guide, the price outside of the OECD should not exceed $3.30 per patient and the
price in low-income countries should not exceed $1.35. 57
The amount of money needed to purchase the low- and middle-income country
IP rights to Cervarix or Gardasil are modest. The lost market for GSK is
approximately US$172 million per year, of which the lost R&D cost recovery is
only US$29.2 million per year until patent expiration. 58
For a patent buy-out price of less than US$30 million per year, Cervarix or
Gardasil could instantly become a generic medicine in all low- and middle-income
countries. The bulk of the world’s women would enjoy much greater access to a
cervical cancer vaccine through generic pricing. The companies would be fully
rewarded for their lost sales in low- and middle-income markets. The proposal is a
bargain for global public health and good business for the companies.
As this article was going to press, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
announced a $27.8 million dollar grant to study the use of the HPV vaccines in the
developing world; this study will focus on “the goal of informing regional and
global vaccine introduction efforts and international financing plans.” 59 This study
should evaluate the merits of this patent buy-out proposal as an alternative to the oftcriticized voluntary programs recently proffered by global drug companies. The end
point for such studies should be the greatest possible vaccination coverage for
women. Generic pricing outside the OECD is one important component in that
program.
1.

Diagnostic tests for cervical cancer
Diagnostic tests present special cost effectiveness issues. Cheaper diagnostics
for AIDS (such as CD4 counts) or microbial infections (identifying susceptibility to
enable better targeting of antibiotics) could lead to more cost effective treatment
with less potential for developing resistance. 60 But diagnostic tests might also
inappropriately drive up health care costs. For example, Digene Corporation has
developed a diagnostic test for HPV. 61 What is not known at present is whether a
cheaper diagnostic would be cost effective from a societal view. In the US, routine
Pap screening leads to several billion dollars of clinical intervention of doubtful

56
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Summary
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http://devdata.worldbank.org/hnpstats/HNPSummary/groupData/GetShowData.asp?sCtry=LMY (last
visited May 9, 2006) (2002 data).
57
Kevin Outterson, HPV Vaccines to Prevent Cervical Cancer: Do Patients or Shareholders Come First?
(working paper, June 10, 2006).
58
Kevin Outterson, NONRIVAL ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICAL KNOWLEDGE, Global Forum 8,
WHO/United Nations Global Forum for Health Research conference on the Millennial Development
Agenda (Mexico City) (presented Nov. 18, 2004). This calculation assumes a global market for
Cervarix of £1 billion per year, with 10% falling in low- and medium-income countries. See MAYNE ,
supra note 23, at 21. The R&D cost recovery percentage is estimated using the 17% number touted by
PhRMA, which probably represents an upper limit estimate. Patrica Barry, Drug Profits vs. Research,
AARP BULLETIN (June 2002), available at http://www.carlmcmillan.com/drug_profits_vs.htm.
59
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Press Release, June 5, 2006; PATH Press Release, June 5, 2006
available at http://www.path.org.
60
Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 7, at § III.A.1.d.
61
Michael Barbaro, Digene to Adapt Cancer Test For Use in Developing World, WASH . POST ,
Feb. 18, 2004, at E 05.
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efficacy and cost effectiveness since most HPV infections regress on their own. 62
The wasteful use of clinical resources following abnormal Pap screening is well
known; indeed, GSK’s HPV-16/18 vaccine derives a significant portion of its
projected cost effectiveness from avoiding “more than US$6 billion … spent each
year on the evaluation and management of low-grade lesions, the majority of which
would regress without intervention.” 63
Of more immediate importance to the developing world, Digene has also created
a streamlined version of the HPV test for use in resource-limited settings. 64 It is
quite possible that more effective detection of HPV might lead to clinical
interventions with very unfavorable cost effectiveness profiles, inappropriately
expanding profligate US practices to resource constrained settings. Nevertheless,
the patent holder for the HPV test is engaged in a global campaign to promote the
adoption of its test as the global standard of care, utilizing clinical sales
representatives, direct to consumer advertising, and strategic relationships with
women’s groups and providers. 65
B. SECOND-LINE HAART DRUGS FOR AIDS
When the Millennium Development Goals were first articulated in 2000, 66
treatment of AIDS with antiretroviral drugs was not considered cost effective for
low-income populations. Annual costs per patient exceeded US$7,000 for first-line
In the
Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) in drug costs alone. 67
world’s low-income countries, per capita health expenditures are only US$29. 68 As
recently as December 2000, HAART prices were so high that the World Bank still
considered ARV treatment in poor countries to be not cost effective. 69 HAART was
simply too expensive.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Partners In Health refused to listen to
conventional wisdom and began treating some of the world’s poorest AIDS patients
with HAART. 70 In the days before the global implementation of the World Trade
Organization TRIPS Agreement, 71 several Indian and Thai companies produced and
62
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exported HAART drugs generically, even though the patent remained valid in
OECD countries. 72 The combination of public outcry and generic competition
forced the prices down to less than US$200 per patient per year. 73
With these dramatic cost reductions, HAART therapy is now deemed cost
effective worldwide. One recent study evaluated several strategies regarding
HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO region: Afr-E) and South East Asia (SearD). The study recommends a range of HIV/AIDS interventions which are highly
cost effective in low-income countries, with a cost per disability adjusted life year
(DALY) ranging from Int$3 to Int$1144 in Afr-E. 74 The study assumes the annual
drug cost of first-line HAART to be Int$177.80, 75 following the data gathered by
MSF. 76
Most patients cannot remain on first-line HAART drugs indefinitely. Whether
due to resistance or intolerance to specific drugs, after a number of years an
increasing number of surviving patients require second-line therapy. 77 Second-line
drugs such as protease inhibitors are not generally available at generic prices in the
developing world. 78 Patented second-line therapies are very expensive in lowincome countries. Even with voluntary discount programs, second-line therapies
cost ten to twenty-six times more than the first-line drugs. 79 The world is stumbling
towards a second AIDS holocaust, even while we struggle to make first-line
therapies affordable and available to the millions who lack treatment access. 80

Instruments–Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS or TRIPS
Agreement]. The United States implemented the WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements
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discount offered by the companies to developing countries was not merely due to public outcry, but
mostly as a response to competition by generic drugs.”).
74
See generally Hogan et al., supra note 4. The most cost effective interventions are mass
media campaigns for safer sex, peer education and treatment of sex workers, prevention of mother to
child transmission (PMCT), treatment of sexually transmitted infections, voluntary counseling and
testing, and ARV therapy. Id. at Tables 3 & 4.
75
Id. at Table A (supplement).
76
See MSF, P RICING GUIDE, supra note 73, at Table A (supplement) n. 5.
77
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain, supra note 7, at 74-75.
78
A recommended second-line regime is TDF+ddI+LPV/r. MEDECINS S ANS FRONTIERES,
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE HEARING ON TRIPS AND ACCESS TO
MEDICINES
6
(Jan.
2005),
available
at
http://europapoort.eerstekamer.nl/cgibin/as.cgi/0345000/c/start/file=/9345000/1/j9vvgy6i0ydh7th/vgbwr4k8ocw2/f=/vgz6mnudecs3.pdf.
[hereinafter HEARING ]. Second-line treatments also are important in conservation of resistance, and
there is no FDC available for second-line treatment as a result of the patents; see Wanla Kulwichit,
First-line and Second-line Antiretroviral Therapy, 364 THE LANCET 329, 329-330 (2004), available at
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/vol364/iss9431/full/llan.364.9431.analysis_and_interpretation.3031
1.1.
79
HEARING, supra note 78, at 5-6 (second-line treatment in low income countries costs about
US$3,950 per year, and as high as US$ 5,000 per year). N.
Kumarasamy, Comment, Generic
Antiretroviral Drugs – Will They Be The Answer to HIV in the Developing World?, 364 THE LANCET
(July
3,
2004),
available
at
http://www.accessmedmsf.org/documents/Lancet2JulycommentaryFDC.pdf. See also MSF, PRICING GUIDE, supra note 73
at 9.
80
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
3
X
5
PROGRESS
REPORT
(Dec.
2004),
http://www.who.int/3by5/ProgressReportfinal.pdf.

12

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 32 NO. 2&3 2006

The non-OECD buy-out price for HAART first- and second-line treatments
would be modest, given the scale of the epidemic. Pharmaceutical companies will
not suffer significant lost profit if all sales of HAART products dropped to zero in
every low- and middle- income country. GSK is the largest global seller of HAART
drugs. 81 GSK reports its sales to the SEC in three geographic regions: the United
States, Europe, and “International.” 82 This latter category includes high- income
countries such as Japan, Canada and Australia, as well as low- and middle-income
countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. 83 Even so, total
International HAART drug sales in 2003 were only £155 million, 84 in a year in
which gross profit was £17.2 billion and selling, general, and administrative
(SG&A) expenses were £7.5 billion. 85 Actual profits from HAART sales in both
low- and middle- income markets are likely to be negligible to GSK’s global profits
and R&D, particularly if OECD markets in these countries remain commercial. The
estimated non-OECD buy-out price for all of GSK’s HAART portfolio is just
US$11.3 million per year in lost R&D cost recovery. 86 The annual budget of the
Global AIDS Conference exceeds this amount with millions to spare. 87 With the
lives of millions at risk, and billions being spent on AIDS programs, the buy-out
price is stunning in its modesty.
C. THE WEAKNESS OF VOLUNTARY PRICING PROGRAMS
Voluntary programs undoubtedly assist some patients. Novartis makes Glivec
(imatrinib) available to 346 chronic myeloid leukemia patients in Malaysia through a
patient-based assistance program. 88 Voluntary donations of ARVs reach some AIDS
patients, and many donor programs are under way, but 90% of the global need is
unmet. 89 Pfizer’s limited donation of Diflucan (fluconazole) (an anti-fungal agent
useful for many purposes, including opportunistic infections in AIDS patients) was a
public relations triumph in December 2000, 90 and yet complaints persist that Pfizer
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Communications Department, XV International AIDS Conference (July 16, 2004), available at
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only permits a miniscule amount to reach patients. 91 In November 2005, Merck and
Bristol Myers Squibb granted royalty-free licenses to the International Partnership
for Microbicides for an anti-HIV vaginal gel. 92 The grants are laudable steps, but
are limited to a very specific product. 93 In the most notable cases, significant
voluntary price reductions were triggered by unlicensed generic production or the
threat of compulsory licensure. 94 No one should mistake voluntary programs for a
systematic, sustainable solution. 95
IV. THE PATENT BUY-OUT PROPOSAL
This Article proposes marginal cost (generic) pricing of patented
pharmaceuticals for low- and middle-income populations (more than 84% of the
world’s population). Innovation is assured by reimbursing the companies for all lost
R&D cost recoveries in those markets. Risks are minimized because the present IP
system is retained for more than 80% of the global patent-based cash flow of the
pharmaceutical companies. The following steps are proposed:
1. The purchaser acquires the patent and exclusive marketing rights for a
patented global medicine from the patent owner, limited to a particular
geographic market. (Example: the Global Fund purchases from GSK the
global non-OECD rights to GSK’s new cervical cancer vaccine. GSK
retains the rights to the vaccine in all OECD countries).
2. The purchaser offers an open, non-exclusive, no royalty license to any
legitimate generic manufacturer, but only for sale in the target markets.
(Normal patent-based pricing remains in all OECD countries; generic
pricing through multiple manufacturers prevails in all non-OECD
countries).
3. The patent owner is compensated under a buy-out formula which mimics
the lost R&D cost recovery from the foregone sales. (Example: GSK is
paid for the lost R&D cost recovery from cervical cancer vaccine sales in
non-OECD countries).
A. THE PURCHASER
The purchaser could be a government (the US or the EU), inter-governmental
organization (WHO, UN, WTO, or the Global Fund), or a foundation donor (Gates).
Governments can exercise compulsory licensure powers within their territories, but
this proposal cannot rely solely on the current scope of compulsory licensure. The
transaction costs and political opposition to negotiating compulsory licenses for each
market country have proven to be almost insurmountable. In the five years since the
much-hyped ‘Doha Solution’ to compulsory licenses for export, not a single pill has
91
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93
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Poor Countries, WASH . P OST , Nov. 1, 2005, at A04.
94
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95
See Tihana Bicanic et al., Antiretroviral Roll-Out Access To Treatment for Cryptococcal
Meningitis, 5 THE LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 530, 530 (Sept. 2005) (“a system that relies on
philanthropic initiatives by the pharmaceutical industry and the pressure of lobby groups cannot result
in sustainable access to medicines.”).
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been produced under that protocol. 96 By offering compensation in exchange for the
non-OECD license, it is hoped that pharmaceutical companies will embrace this
proposal rather than force governments to pursue parallel compulsory licensure
processes.
B. THE TARGET MARKET
The simplest formulation would divide the world in two: the thirty relatively
richer countries that are members of the OECD 97 , and all other countries. Simplicity
means rough justice, but surely rough justice is better than no justice. Poverty does
not strictly follow political boundaries. Some elites in poor countries will gain
access to generic-priced medicines when they could have afforded full price. Some
poor people in OECD countries may not be able to afford their prescriptions, and
could have benefited from generic pricing. 98 Perhaps the latter group can be left to
the care of their relatively-affluent governments (although in the US, approximately
27% of the population lacked prescription drug insurance in 2005 prior to the
introduction of Medicare Part D). 99 Over-inclusion of developing-country elites is
more likely to attract controversy.
Over-inclusion results in lost patent rents, particularly in countries like China,
India and Brazil with millions of middle class consumers. If simplicity is desired,
this over-inclusion will simply be tolerated. It will increase the buy-out price, so the
companies still receive their due rewards. If anything, the inequity is between the
donor and the target country government. Perhaps China, Brazil or India (or similar
countries) could compensate the donor for this inappropriate subsidy.
Alternatively, PhRMA companies have demonstrated remarkable skill in
segmenting markets with tiered differential pricing within particular countries. 100
The persistence of domestic differential pricing within the US, even in the face of
extensive donor programs, is a testament to the effectiveness of market segmentation
by PhRMA companies and the apparent weakness of actual pharmaceutical arbitrage
pressure. Possible mechanisms are brand campaigns with trademarks, differential
pricing by payor, and domestic legal restrictions on arbitrage. 101
C. THE GENERIC LICENSE
The purchaser will offer a non-exclusive, no-royalty license to all legitimate
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Negotiations will not be required, and transaction
costs will remain very minimal.
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In order to maximize the geographic reach of the generic licenses, and to ensure
competition in each country, drugs licensed under this system which are prequalified by the WHO should be granted automatic marketing approval in all of the
target countries, a form of reference approval in lieu of a country by country ANDA
process. 102
D. SETTING THE BUY-OUT PRICE 103
The buy-out price must be set high enough to optimize global pharmaceutical
innovation and low enough to be affordable for all global diseases. Lanjouw and
Jack effectively set the price at zero by requiring drug companies to choose between
patents in rich countries or poor countries. 104 If global pharmaceutical appropriation
is already supra-optimal, then zero (or a negative value) is the correct price. 105
Policymakers should have transparent access to reliable data on global
pharmaceutical innovation in order to answer that question.
If the goal of the buy-out price is to mimic what would have happened under
best-case competitive market conditions, then the price should be based on expected
profits rather than sales or costs. Ganslandt, Maskus & Wong used cost data to
calculate their buy-out price, which rewards effort rather than success. 106 Gross sales
are certainly an element of pharmaceutical appropriation, but the relevant market
metrics are the net present value (NPV) of the cash flow or the NPV of the profit
stream. The purpose of the buy-out price should be to restore the expected profits,
and more particularly, the lost R&D cost recovery.
Expected future profits will of course be difficult to estimate and subject to
gaming. The following formula relies to the greatest extent possible on externally
generated data, to avoid data manipulation and methodological squabbles, with
retrospective experience adjustments:
BOP = NPVt (d) (U * M) p
BOP is the buy-out price; NPV is the net present value over the patent period t
at discount rate d; U is the number of generic units sold in the target markets by all
sellers during t; M is the marginal cost of production per unit, estimated as the
lowest sustained actual price per unit during t; p is a profit adjustor, reflecting the
percentage of revenues allocated to R&D cost recovery (14-17% are the estimates
from drug companies).
Estimated payments could be made at buy-out, subject to periodic and
retrospective adjustment as actual data developed on U and M, and perhaps for
changes in d. The formula minimizes the need to know actual costs, profits, or
average sales prices. The only data required are actual number of generic unit sales
and the lowest sustained price by any generic seller in the target markets. Both are
102
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103
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104
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105
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relatively easy to collect and difficult for the patent holder (or anyone else) to
manipulate.
This formula aligns incentives against rent-seeking and allocative inefficiency in
helpful ways. The license encourages any pharmaceutical company to manufacture
and sell the drug generically in all target markets. Competition will drive the unit
price down towards the actual marginal cost of production. In a competitive market
with multiple entrants, no single company controls either U or M, but they each have
strong market incentives to maximize U and to minimize M, which translates into
the greatest access for a market-determined low price.
V. CONCLUSION
For a remarkably modest price, the battles over TRIPS and essential medicines
could be largely resolved. Pharmaceutical rent appropriation could be avoided in
low- and middle-income countries, while fully protecting innovation incentives. As
the chronic diseases of the rich and poor worlds converge, a noble opportunity arises
for doing well while doing good.

